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 The police and the far right in Greece: a case study of police voting behaviour in 
Athens 
Abstract 
The electoral advance of the far right party of Golden Dawn has left a clear mark on the Greek 
parliamentary elections of 2012. A less debated aspect of these results involves the extent of the 
electoral influence of Golden Dawn among police personnel. Using electoral data from two districts in 
Greece's capital city, this paper explores the extent of that influence among major front line police 
units based in those localities. Our analysis obtains clear indications that Golden Dawn's presence has 
been much more emphatic among police personnel than among the general public. These results 
warrant further exploration of this development, particularly in light of the possibility that far-right 
ideology may influence the character of everyday policing in Greece and the use of police discretion 
at the detriment of vulnerable or politically undesirable groups.  
 
  
 The police and the far right in Greece: a case study of police voting behaviour in 
Athens 
Introduction 
This paper explores the extent of the electoral influence of the far-right, particularly of the far-right 
party of Golden Dawn, among members of the police personnel in Greece. The rise and affirmation of 
Golden Dawn as a significant political force since the beginning of the 2010s has attracted considerable 
public and scholarly attention (Ellinas, 2013; Georgiadou, 2013; Halikiopoulou & Vasilopoulou, 2013; 
Psarras, 2012; Smith, 2013, 2014). Indeed, the sheer quantitative weight of the far-right vote has been 
one of the most dramatic aspects of the parliamentary elections of 6 May and 17 June 2012, whose 
results we consider in this paper. Subsequent analyses have queried the party's electoral influence 
(Mavris, 2013), to an extent that one may speak of an extensive recomposition of the far- and populist 
right in Greece, featuring Golden Dawn as a dominant formation in that political space. The party has 
had a turbulent and highly controversial course since the twin elections of 2012. It was found at the 
centre of a high profile judicial investigation initiated against it as a criminal organisation in October 
2013, and criminal trial procedures against Golden Dawn members, including its leadership and 
several MPs commenced in May 2015. It nevertheless still received just under 9.5%, 6.3% and 6.9% of 
the popular vote in the 2014 European elections, and the January 2015 and September 2015 general 
elections respectively.1 
Yet one of the aspects of Golden Dawn's ascent that continues to be downplayed and even 
dismissed by mainstream political actors and commentators has been the extent of this party's 
influence among police personnel, particularly among front line services, such as patrol and 
emergency response units as well as the riot police, whose role in maintaining public order has been 
accentuated in crisis-ridden Greece. This situation constitutes a serious knowledge gap in light of a 
continuing stream of reports by human rights organisations and left-wing activists of a certain 
convergence, if not practical complicity, between these police units and Golden Dawn activists 
(Amnesty International, 2014; Greek Ombudsman, 2013; Human Rights Watch, 2013, 2015; 
                                                     
1 In October 2013, the leadership, including several MPs, and several other members of Golden Dawn were 
prosecuted by Greek judicial authorities on charges of forming and operating a criminal organisation (art.187 of the Greek 
Penal Code). The incident that prompted judicial action has been the murder of Pavlos Fyssas, a leftist musician and activist 
by a member of Golden Dawn allegedly acting as part of a hit squad operating under orders and guidance from the party's 
local and national leadership. A discussion of the investigation and the details reaching the public domain would lie beyond 
the scope of this article. We are very confident that the effort of the prosecuting authorities and the leadership of the 
Hellenic Police to root out Golden Dawn support from various Hellenic Police units does not render our analysis outdated 
nor does it invalidate any of the questions we are raising here, particularly in light of the party's resilience in subsequent 
elections.  
 Margaronis, 2012b; Mason, 2012). The urgency of the matter is only underscored by the considerable 
deficit of academic research on key aspects of the organisation, practice and social composition of the 
police force in Greece. 
The analysis of the results of the 2012 elections presented in this paper offers compelling evidence 
that relations between the far- and populist right and the personnel of the police in large key units in 
Athens are firm and extensive. The implications could be far reaching arguably. If important parts of 
Greece's national police service are becoming colonised by far-right ideology, then elements of that 
ideology—extreme nationalism, notions of racial purity and glorification of vigilante style violence as 
means to promote those ideas— are becoming more likely to underpin the character of everyday 
policing and the use of police discretion at the detriment of vulnerable or politically undesirable 
groups. A more systematic investigation of Golden Dawn's influence among police personnel is thus 
fully warranted. The opportunity, as explained below, to interrogate the electoral behaviour of police 
personnel offers additional significant insights on the far-right's influence on parts of the Greek state 
personnel, an aspect which only very recently has drawn scholarly attention (Christopoulos, 2014a, 
2014b). 
A detailed discussion of Golden Dawn as a political formation lies beyond the scope of this paper, 
and interested readers would be well advised to explore the rapidly developing literature regarding 
the party's origins, discourse and political practice (Dinas et al., 2013; Doxiadis & Matsaganis, 2012; 
Ellinas, 2012; Ellinas, 2013; Georgiadou, 2013; Halikiopoulou & Vasilopoulou, 2013; Psarras, 2012; 
Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2015; Xenakis, 2012). This literature also offers the necessary 
conceptual links to the wider voluminous literature on the far- and populist right phenomenon (e.g., 
Eatwell & Mudde, 2004; Mudde, 2000, 2007; Taguieff, 2012; Wilson & Hainsworth, 2012) We draw 
selectively from this literature in so far as the analysis and insights found in it may pertinently inform 
the discussion of our findings from the viewpoint of police sociology. As our investigation capitalises 
on conditions resembling a natural experiment, our main focus is on the election results and police 
voting behaviour. In the first part of this paper we offer the indispensable background information on 
the twin elections of 2012, and on the particularities of the Greek electoral system by means of which 
our observations were made possible. The bulk of our analysis focuses on the actual police vote: we 
document and explore the rise and stabilisation of the far right's electoral influence in two key 
operational formations of the Hellenic Police in the capital city of Greece, Athens in the May and June 
elections. The concluding part situates our results and outlines a number of possible paths for further 
investigation, building on both the limited existing knowledge on the police in Greece and extant 
insights regarding the nature, reasons and extent of the apparent convergence between police 
personnel and the party of Golden Dawn. 
The twin elections of 2012: issues and dramatis factiones 
Greece's twin elections of 2012 occurred in a highly charged and polarised political atmosphere. 
Following the early dissolution of the parliament elected in October 2009, the first general election 
took place on 6 May 2012. It resulted in a hung parliament and was thus followed by the second 
general election of 17 June 2012, whose result made possible the formation of a coalition government 
supported by the centre-right and centre-left, namely the conservative New Democracy party, the 
social-democratic party PASOK, and the centre-left Democratic Left, which, however, left the coalition 
 in the summer of 2013. The government under the conservative Antonis Samaras implemented the 
severe austerity programme in continuation of its predecessors' policies since 2010. But while the 
twin elections of 2012 provided a certain political resolution to what at the time appeared as an acute 
and catastrophic dilemma for Greece's economic and political future, they constituted nothing less 
than a radical overturn of that country's political scene.2 
The crisis has engendered an acute rupture of relations of political representation and a 
generalised state of incredulity towards the discourses emanated from a range of power centres, 
including institutions of government and technical expertise, the media or even trade unions. Such 
development has been reflected, firstly, in increasing political instability. The government of Georgios 
Papandreou of the PASOK social democrats, which came to power by an astounding 10.5% margin of 
the popular vote over the outgoing conservative New Democracy of Costas Karamanlis, was replaced 
in late 2011 by a government led by the former head of the Bank of Greece Lucas Papadimos and 
supported by a parliamentary coalition of New Democracy and PASOK. Secondly, at the level of 
everyday social relations, it has also activated a dark undercurrent of racism, xenophobia and 
conspiratorial right wing populism. The rise of the extreme right, which openly scapegoated the 
increasing population of migrants as a key and deadly threat to the nation's cohesion and prosperity, 
has been underpinned by this very same current (Georgiadou, 2013; Margaronis, 2012a; Vasilopoulou 
& Halikiopoulou, 2015). 
With the political scene looking increasingly fluid and uncertain under mounting popular 
discontent and the superintendence of the IMF-ECB-European Commission 'troika', the established 
major political formations contested for the popular vote both against their own splinters taking the 
form of new dissident parties, and against up and coming forces on the left and the right of the political 
spectrum. In the buildup to the 6 May election, a clear division emerged between a side arguing for 
the necessity of the implementation of the memorandum as means for the salvation of Greece's 
position in the eurozone and as a blueprint for structural reform, and another side openly challenging 
the memorandum, its consequences and its conditions of implementation under the superintendence 
of the troika (e.g. Lanchester, 2012; Rogers, 2012). The result of the 6 May election indicated a 
collapse, below a cumulative 35%, of the established two-party system, whose components New 
Democracy and PASOK stood firmly in support of the memorandum. At the same time, it brought to 
the political centre stage the previously minor, radical leftist party of SYRIZA as a contender for an 
anti-memorandum parliamentary majority (Ovenden, 2015). Thus the public's polarisation on the 
memorandum issue became considerably more intense in the run-up to the election of 17 June. 
Since a detailed profiling of the political formations and their manifestos is not feasible here, and 
our concern is the electoral influence of the far-right, in what follows we opt for more conventional 
lines of political demarcation using the Right-Left axis. For our analysis, we focus primarily on the 
results of the seven parties that gained parliamentary representation in May and June 2012, namely 
the conservative New Democracy ('ND'), the left-wing SYRIZA, the social-democratic PASOK, the 
renegade conservative party Aneksartitoi Ellines ('Independent Greeks'—'ANEL'), the Communist 
                                                     
2 A reference to Greece's economic and social meltdown since the imposition of the austerity programme would 
be imperative for understanding the complex dynamics that shaped the results of the 2012 elections. Anything more than 
a brief and selective reference would go well beyond the scope of this paper, but a number of more comprehensive 
accounts may now be found in the English language (Douzinas, 2013, Lynn, 2011, Manolopoulos, 2011; Mitsopoulos & 
Pelagidis, 2012; Pryce, 2012). 
 Party of Greece ('KKE'), Golden Dawn ('GDawn') and the centre left Democratic Left ('DIMAR'). 
Secondly, we have specifically included in our calculations the party of Popular Orthodox Rally ('LAOS'), 
which in the 2000s had been the major political formation of the populist and far right and had gained 
parliamentary representation in the 2007 and 2009 elections. An analysis of the electoral influence of 
the extreme right would be incomplete without taking explicitly into account the result of LAOS. 
We also present the results of smaller parties which polled above 1%, but did not gain any 
parliamentary seats. Other parties polling under 1% appear in our analysis under the category 'Other', 
regardless of their political orientation. A more detailed look at the results of smaller parties would 
reveal that the balance between Right and Left is tilted to the centre-right overall. On the left side of 
the political spectrum on the Green Party ('Greens') and the radical left party of ANTARSYA polled 
above 1%, while the centre-right parties of Democratic Alliance ('DS'), Drasi and Demiourgia Ksana 
('Creation Again'—'DemKs') all polled just short of the 3% threshold for parliamentary representation 
in May 2012 and thus represent the largest portion of the popular vote in this category. In June 2012, 
'Drasi' and 'Demiourgia Ksana' formed an electoral coalition, whereas Democratic Alliance 
collaborated with New Democracy. As we look specifically at the influence of the extreme right, their 
results do not have significant import for our analysis, and, additionally, the category 'Other' simplifies 
our presentation. The results of those smaller parties are taken into account when we aggregate using 
the Right-Left axis. Thus, ND, ANEL, Golden Dawn, LAOS, DS, Drasi and Demiourgia Ksana represent 
the political Right, with Golden Dawn and LAOS representing specifically the extreme right, and 
SYRIZA, PASOK, KKE, DIMAR, the Greens and ANTARSYA represent the Left. 
Greek electoral legislation and special electoral rolls 
A closer look at the police vote is made possible in Greece by a special provision of the electoral 
legislation, currently article 27 of p.d. (presidential decree) 26/2012. Members of the personnel of the 
Hellenic Police, Fire Brigade, Greek Armed Forces and Coast Guard may choose to vote in the district 
where their unit is based at the time a general election is called. These individuals must declare in 
advance their intention to vote in the municipality they serve in, and thus are included in what are 
known as special electoral rolls. Within a particular constituency they are then distributed among the 
polling stations of that constituency, and on the day of the election they vote alongside the 
constituents regularly registered to vote at those polling stations. 
In Greece, citizens are entitled to vote in the constituency in whose electoral rolls they are 
included. However, unlike, for example, in the UK, this is not the constituency in which they reside, 
but rather the constituency in whose municipal registers they have been included, typically the 
constituency in which their birth was registered. A special procedure is required for people to migrate 
to the municipal register of the place where they normally reside, and many people simply remain on 
the registers of their birthplace for life. As the electoral legislation does not permit postal vote, 
members of the general public must travel back to their place of origin in order to exercise their right 
to vote. Special electoral rolls, therefore, facilitate the participation of army, police, fire brigade and 
coast guard officers in the elections, while ensuring minimum interruption of service by these state 
agencies around and on the day of the election. The key point here is that voters on the special 
electoral rolls are an addition to a constituency's electorate comprised of members of the general 
public. 
 Within any constituency, electoral rolls reflect the administrative divisions into communities and 
municipalities, or, in the case of municipalities with a population larger than 5,000, electoral districts. 
Voters who are included in the (regular) electoral roll are then allocated to electoral departments 
within districts according to their registered address in order to ensure that they are allocated to 
approximately equal size groups to vote at a nearby polling station. The law (p.d. 8/2000) explicitly 
states proximity as the main criterion for the allocation of voters to electoral departments and the 
procedure ensuring the application of this principle takes into account both older and newer 
administrative and other divisions, such as parish boundaries or post codes. The same principle of 
proximity applies to the allocation to polling stations of voters included in the special electoral rolls. 
Therefore, police officers, for example, are allocated to particular polling stations in the vicinity of the 
police station in which they serve. Because the electoral legislation places an upper limit to the 
number of voters that can be allocated to a polling station (theoretically up to 800, according to art. 
55 p.d. 26/2012), special electoral register voters attached to larger units are also allocated in 
approximately equal size groups across nearby polling stations (art. 53 p.d. 26/2012). 
The result of the above procedure is that in any given constituency two types of polling stations 
can be found: firstly, regular polling stations, where those normally included in the electoral roll of 
that constituency exercise their right to vote; and, secondly, special polling stations, which include 
regular constituents and members of the police, fire brigade, armed forces and coast guard who have 
been allocated to vote there on the basis of the special electoral register. Consequently, polling 
stations of the second type include a larger number of registered voters, since those included in the 
special electoral register are added to those included in the regular electoral register. For example, if 
regular polling stations within a given constituency include 500 registered voters, special polling 
stations will include 700, that is, 500 regular constituents and 200 members of the police, army etc. It 
is also important to note that, because the procedure for the allocation is carried out by administrative 
and judicial authorities, members of these different agencies are normally allocated to vote in 
different polling stations, so in the above example the additional 200 voters will all be police officers 
or army officers and so on. 
Our dataset 
In this paper we use the feature of special polling stations in order to make inferences about the voting 
behaviour of the police in Greece's capital city of Athens. We focus on the central unit of the largest 
police formation in Athens, and nationally, the General Police Directorate of Attica (GADA). Located 
in the area of Ampelokipoi, in the heart of the city of Athens, GADA's central unit includes the 
formation's headquarters and staff units as well as specialised CID units (such as the drug or vice 
squad), and also critical front line units, particularly the special patrol and emergency response unit 
known as 'Amesi Drasi' ('instant action'). The latter comprises the car and motorcycle units which 
provide the bulk of patrol in greater Athens and are also responsible for fast response to incidents 
(p.d. 1/2001, see also Hellenic Police, n.d.). In Athens, GADA is also the organisational umbrella for the  
motorcycle and motorbike fast-response units DELTA and DIAS. More particularly DIAS (an acronym 
standing for 'motorbike policing' that reads as the name of the ancient greek deity Zeus) relies 
exclusively on motorbikes and is currently 2,500-strong, armed and intended to provide 'rapid and 
combative intervention' (Hellenic Police, n.d.) particularly in incidents of violent crime. But it has now 
 become omnipresent in Athens (and other large cities) as a patrol unit too. The second important 
front line component of GADA, the Police Operations Directorate, primarily comprises the riot police 
units and is based in the eastern sector of greater Athens, in the municipality of Kesariani. It was, in 
fact, in Kesariani, where Golden Dawn's increasing electoral influence was detected as early as the 
2009 general election, by means of querying the results of the special polling stations to which the 
personnel of the riot police units had been allocated (Bartsokas, 2009). By including both the results 
of Kesariani as well as the results returned by the stations in the vicinity of GADA's central unit, we 
essentially investigate the voting behaviour of the bulk of front line police units serving in Athens, 
particularly the inner city. 
We have obtained from the Attiki (Greater Athens) Region the numbers of the special polling 
stations in the constituencies concerned (Athens A and Athens B), using the procedure established by 
art. 5 of the Greek Code of Administrative Procedure (L.2969/1999). This is the equivalent in Greek 
legislation of a FOI request. Such course of action was necessary because, in the wake of the May 
election and initial commentary on the police vote for Golden Dawn in Greek media, the Region was 
rather reluctant to make known the numbers of the special polling stations without following this 
formal procedure, even though this is publicly available information theoretically. This was due to 
both an initial uncertainty as to whether this information could be released to researchers, and, 
interestingly, fear of Golden Dawn reprisals. Even though there were no major changes in the 
allocation of special polling stations for the June election, a small number of special polling station 
was reshuffled, and our dataset was modified accordingly for the purposes of analysis. 
As explained above, the police units in question are located in two different constituencies of the 
greater metropolitan area of Athens. Firstly, GADA's central unit is located within the boundaries of 
the constituency of Athens A, Greece's third largest constituency, with 490,339 registered voters 
electing 17 MPs in May and June 2012. From an administrative point of view, Athens A consists in the 
City of Athens in its entirety and comprises seven electoral districts, which themselves largely coincide 
with the city's seven municipal communities. The 7th municipal community and electoral district, is 
the largest one with a population of approximately 160,000 according to the 2001 census and it 
comprises the areas of Polygono, Gyzi, Ampelokipoi and Erythros Stavros. It presents a degree of 
socioeconomic diversity, as the western and southwestern areas are in continuation of the inner city 
lower middle class areas, such as Kypseli, whereas the areas towards the northeast are more markedly 
middle class, especially those that lie in proximity to the neighbouring affluent area of Psychico. For 
electoral purposes, it was divided in ten departments comprising in total 88,476 and 89,188 registered 
voters in May and June respectively. In both elections these voters were allocated in 151 polling 
stations in total. 
Consistently with the legislative guidelines and established practice, the special polling stations 
were located in the vicinity of police services. Thus our dataset includes the results of 70 of the 
District's polling stations, namely the stations of electoral departments 27–29, 37 and 38 of Athens A 
(stations 796–846 and 856–874), all found in the area of Ampelokipoi, in the eastern part of the 
district. GADA's central service, the police station of Ampelokipoi, and some of the services of the 
Headquarters of the Hellenic Police and Ministry of Public Order (MPO) are located in this area. Voters 
included in the special electoral registers were allocated in 42 and 43 special polling stations in May 
and June respectively. It can be assumed with confidence on the basis of the rule of proximity and the 
distribution of registered voters that all these stations were police polling stations, with the possible 
 exception of one station which may have been allocated to the nearby local fire brigade unit. 
We have excluded the other departments of the district because they did not comprise any special 
stations. Additionally, while no other significant differences between the regular polling stations of 
Ampelokipoi and those of the rest of the 7th District were found in our preliminary analyses, the 
electorate in the former voted more for the New Democracy party and less for Syriza and PASOK. 
Therefore by excluding the other departments in our comparisons between regular and special polling 
stations, we account for the more conservative profile of this particular locality. 
The second district we examine is Kesariani, which lies in the east of the City of Athens, and of 
Ampelokipoi. The base of the Attiki Police Operations Directorate is located in this district, which 
comprises a population of just less than 27,000 according to the 2001 census. For electoral purposes 
Kesariani belongs to the constituency of Athens B, which comprises approximately 1.4m registered 
voters and elects 42 MPs, approximately 14% of the members of the Greek parliament. In Kesariani, 
approximately 26,000 people were registered to vote in the 2012 elections, but this figure also 
includes the police officers serving with the Directorate. The presence of these units makes for an 
intriguing contrast, as Kesariani has been historically a stronghold of the left—for example, in the local 
elections of 2010 (for which special registers do not apply), the candidate of the Communist Party 
alone polled at around 25%, whereas the official conservative candidate received just over 10% of the 
vote. 
From an administrative viewpoint the organisation of elections in Kesariani is much simpler 
compared to that of the City of Athens: voters were allocated to 44 polling stations distributed in two 
electoral departments. Most special polling stations were included in the first department (stations 
1784–1806) on the east-southeast side of the town where the police units, including the local police 
station are located, whereas, conversely the second department consisted almost exclusively of 
regular polling stations. 
Table 1 presents and allows a comparison between the national result, the district result and the 
results of the special and regular polling stations in our sample for both elections. We also provide 
aggregate results by general political orientation (left, right and extreme right) so as to facilitate 
comparisons. The results by party and political orientation immediately permit the observation that 
Golden Dawn polled better in special polling stations. The other party of the extreme right, LAOS, also 
performed above its constituency and national average. Finally, the share of the left plunged well 
below its national and constituency averages. As the only factor differentiating special from regular 
polling stations was precisely the addition of the police voters from nearby police services, clearly, this 
outlook raises questions about the voting behaviour of the police and thus a more detailed analysis is 
clearly warranted. 
 
 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Difference between special and regular polling stations 
The purpose of our analysis was to examine whether the observed variation in the election results of 
 special and regular polling stations was systematic. Using the type of polling station as independent 
variable, we compared the results between the two types (special, regular) of polling stations for each 
party, and also for groupings of parties according to their positioning on the left, right, and far right 
(XRight) of the political spectrum; note that the categories 'right' and 'extreme right' have not been 
constructed as mutually exclusive. The unit of analysis in this instance was polling stations, thus our 
calculations are based on the party (and party groupings) average percentage of the vote in the polling 
stations. This value may differ from the aggregate reported in Table 1. Our approach has been to 
compare the two means by performing an independent samples t-test, except when the assumption 
of normality was violated. In these cases we performed an equivalent non-parametric test (Mann-
Witney). All statistical tests were two-sided, and p values of less than 0.05 were considered to indicate 
statistical significance. We have produced four sets of results for the polling stations in Ampelokipoi 
(as described above) and Kesariani in the May (Table 2) and June (Table 3) 2012 elections respectively. 
A general observation applying to all four sets of results regards the inclusion of the number of 
registered voters and of the turnout in our tests. The inclusion of the number of registered voters and 
the comparison of the respective means between special and regular polling stations serves to 
document the observation that voters on the special register constitute an addition to the number of 
regular voters, and thus that a systematic difference between the two types of stations existed. On 
average, in the May election special polling stations in Ampelokipoi and Kesariani included about 151 
and 91 additional (police) voters on average respectively, while in June these figures were 158 and 
100 (police) voters on average respectively. Furthermore, consistently with the purpose of special 
polling stations, which is to allow serving police officers to exercise their right to vote at a polling place 
near the location of their unit, voter turnout was significantly higher in special polling stations both in 
Ampelokipoi and Kesariani in both elections. 
Results on 6 May 2012 
The analysis of the election results indicates that significant differences occurred between the 
behaviour of voters in the special and regular polling stations of both Ampelokipoi and Kesariani on 
the election of 6 May 2012, particularly in connection with the parties of the left and of the extreme 
right (see Table 2). 
In Ampelokipoi, where the bulk of the police personnel assigned to regular frontline police services 
of GADA (motorised patrol, CID) cast their vote, Golden Dawn polled higher in special polling stations 
(Mdn=14.58) than regular polling stations (Mdn=6.28). This difference was significant (U=61, z=-6.32, 
p=.001), representing a large effect size r=-.76. The other party of the far right, LAOS, also polled 
significantly higher t(68)=3.08, p=.003 in special polling stations (M=3.4, SE=.15) than in regular ones 
(M=2.65, SE=.19), well above its national and district averages. This difference represented a medium 
effect size r=.35. Similarly, the renegade right wing ANEL also polled significantly better in the stations 
where the police voted (M=10.12, SE=.24; Regular stations M=8.37, SE=.42; t(68)=3.83, p=.001, r=.42), 
whereas there was no significant difference for the New Democracy vote between the two types of 
stations. 
All parties of the left polled significantly worse in the special polling stations. Voters in the later 
voted less for SYRIZA (M=14.23, SE=.41; regular: M=18.43, SE=.46). This difference was significant 
t(68.)=-6.62, p=.001, and represented a large effect size r=.63. Results in special polling stations were 
 similarly worse for the Communist Party (Special: mdn=6.01, regular: mdn=8.52; U=153, z=-5.22, 
p=.001, r=.62), but we found no significant difference for ANTARSYA. On the centre left, the outgoing 
PASOK polled worse in special stations (M=9.21, SE=.29; regular: M=10.77, SE=.37; t(68)=-3.28, 
p=.002, r=.37), whereas no significant difference was found in the results of the centre-left DIMAR. 
Overall in the special polling stations of Ampelokipoi the left polled significantly worse (M=39.3, 
SE=.71; regular: 48.41, SE=.69; t(68)=-8.77, p=.001, r=.73), and the right and extreme right significantly 
higher: voters in special polling stations voted more for the extreme right (Mdn=17.76) than voters in 
ordinary polling stations (Mdn=9.17), a difference that was significant (U=57, z=-6.37, p=.001) and 
represented a large effect size r=-.76. The vote for the extreme right and for Golden Dawn more 
specifically appears to account for the difference in favour of the right in its entirety since Golden 
Dawn in special stations polled better by 8.5%, whereas the result of the right as a whole was higher 
by 8.7%. 
In Kesariani, where the riot police units are based, similar patterns emerged, with Golden Dawn 
polling significantly higher in special polling stations (Mdn=12.48; regular: Mdn=5.01; U=26, z=-5.01, 
p=.001, r=.76). Voters in special polling stations also voted significantly more for LAOS (M=2.92, 
SE=.19; regular: M=2.3, SE=.20; t(42)=2.2, p=.033). While this difference was significant, it represents 
a medium effect size r=.32. No significant statistical difference existed for the results of ANEL, and of 
New Democracy. Conversely, voters in special polling stations voted significantly less for SYRIZA 
(M=21.93; SE=.58; regular: M=26.73; SE=.76; t(42)=-5.05, p=.001, r=-.62), and KKE (M=15.17, SE=.57; 
regular: M=17.54, SE=.71; t(42), p=.013, r=-.37). Again in this district the vote for the Golden Dawn 
would account almost for the whole the difference in favour of the right as this party in special stations 
polled better by about 8.0%, whereas the result of the right in its entirety was higher by about 9%. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Results on 17 June 
While the results in the electoral district we examine were marked by Golden Dawn's emphatic 
presence in May, the results of the much more polarised June 2012 election reveal much about Golden 
Dawn's remarkable resilience (Table 3). 
In the special polling stations of Ampelokipoi, where Golden Dawn's percentage of the vote was 
above its national average (see Table 1), support for the party was significantly stronger (Mdn=11.66, 
regular: Mdn=5.87; U=61, z=-6.27, p=.001), and this difference represented a large effect size r=-.75. 
Significant differences, but of smaller magnitude, were found for the results of LAOS (special: M=2.23, 
SE=.13; regular: M=1.63, SE=.12; t(68)=3.17, p=.002, r=.36), whereas we found no significant 
differences between special and regular polling stations for the other parties of the right, ND and 
ANEL. Conversely, support for SYRIZA was significantly lower in special polling stations (M=19.65, 
SE=.58; regular: M=25.86, SE=.72; t(68)=-6.64, p=.001, r=.63) and also for KKE (Mdn=3.09, regular: 
Mdn=4.49; U=315, z=-3.2, p=.001) and PASOK (special: M=8.27, SE=.30; regular: M=9.26, SE=.37; 
t(68)=-2.07, p=.042), although the effect in these cases was of medium magnitude (r=.38 and r=.24 
 respectively). 
Overall, the left was significantly weaker in special polling stations (Mdn=39.66) than in regular 
stations (Mdn=48.36) and this difference U=139, z=-5.38, p=.001 represented a large effect size 
(r=.64). On the right of the political spectrum, the conservative vote, following the national trend, 
shifted toward the New Democracy party, however, the swing to the right in special polling stations 
(8.5%) can again be accounted for almost in its entirety by the strong result of the extreme right and 
Golden Dawn in particular (8.4%). The difference in support for the extreme right in special polling 
stations was significant (special: Mdn=14.68, regular: Mdn=7.04; U=63, z=-6.24, p=.001, r=-.75). 
A slightly different image emerges from the results of Kesariani, where there was a significant 
statistical difference between special (M=23.07, SE=.55) and regular (M=17.93, SE=.6) polling stations 
in support for New Democracy (t(42)=6.3, p=.001, r=.7). Golden Dawn also polled significantly higher 
in special polling stations (Mdn=11.22; regular: Mdn=4.9; U=19, z=-5.18 p=.001,r=.78). The right was 
significantly stronger in the special polling stations (M=43.38, SE=4.43; regular: M=32.2, SE=3.29; 
t(42)=9.23, p=.001, r=.82) and so was the extreme right (special: Mdn=12.94; regular: Mdn=6.25; 
U=17, z=-5.22, p=.001, r=.79). These results suggest a different composition of the vote on the right 
of the political spectrum which cannot be merely interpreted as a reflection of the national trend in 
support of New Democracy in June 2012. On the other side of the political spectrum, all parties of the 
left were significantly weaker in the special polling stations (see Table 3). 
Now, considering our results in their entirety, it is remarkable that the addition of 100-150 voters 
on average to special polling stations has sufficed to change or distort quite dramatically the profiles 
of these electoral districts. Overall, the electoral performance of the parties of the right in the special 
polling stations is a relatively less surprising finding, since prior studies offering a social, political and 
ideological profile of police personnel in Greece (Papakonstantis, 2003) would support well the idea 
that police officers typically exhibit a significant voting preference for the right.  
The significant electoral support for Golden Dawn is a more puzzling finding. The argument we 
advance in the remainder of this article is that the electoral boost that Golden Dawn received in the 
special polling stations as specifically linked to the status of these voters as police officers. Before we 
proceed in this direction, however, a cautionary note is due.  
Our dataset does not allow an exploration of the idea that this boost may reflect the wider 
demographic profile of the Golden Dawn vote among police officers. A large number of police officers 
voting in the two districts we examine, particularly in Kesariani, are younger males, a demographic 
group that, according to exit poll data analyses, has constituted the core of Golden Dawn's electoral 
audience (Halikiopoulou & Vasilopoulou, 2013). Women as a demographic group are severely under-
represented in the Hellenic Police, comprising just under 13% of police personnel overall (Hellenic 
Police, 2011). This characteristic is even more accentuated in front-line units such as the ones we have 
examined; for example, no women serve with riot police units. Similarly, fast response or riot police 
units are typically populated with younger officers. Even though we would expect to find, particularly 
in Ampelokipoi, due to the size and composition of the unit, a more varied mix in terms of age, it is 
still reasonable to assume that the demographic profile of our sample is generally skewed towards 
younger ages.  
This limitation of our study is also exacerbated by the fact that data allowing the construction of 
a detailed demographic, social and occupation profile of Hellenic Police personnel are not available. 
More recent examinations of the demographic profile of the Golden Dawn vote have suggested that 
 age, gender and employment status are not predictors of electoral support for this party (Vasilopoulou 
& Halikiopoulou, 2015, ch. 3). At the same time, it had been found that Golden Dawn had generally 
fared less well among public sector employees (Halikiopoulou & Vasilopoulou, 2013). Given this 
contradiction, the resolution of the puzzle of Golden Dawn support among the police may arguably lie 
in the more concrete distributions of age and gender in Hellenic Police units and also the considerable 
background,  income, status and work conditions differentials that are known to exist among 
categories of personnel. While police unions in Greece have consistently offered ample indications 
and have been vocal with regard to the existence of such issues (POASY, 2015), there is a genuine 
knowledge gap, which would preclude this interesting path of investigation, even if our dataset 
allowed it.  
In light of the above, we must underscore that our data do not, and could not, offer support to a 
sweeping claim that police officers voted en masse for the extreme right. This particular view gained 
much publicity in Greece after firstly appearing in newspapers, such as To Vima and Kathimerini, which 
focused precisely on the results of special stations in Ampelokipoi (Lambropoulos, 2012; Souliotis, 
2012). The fact remains that the results leave little doubt that a significant portion of the police vote 
was directed towards the extreme right and Golden Dawn. In anticipation of the much-needed more 
detailed empirical examinations of both police vote and far-right vote in Greece, in what follows we 
develop a tentative general framework for linking the far-right voting preference with particular 
historical, organisational and political characteristics of the Hellenic Police. 
Situating the convergence between the police and the extreme right in Greece 
Following from the preceding analysis, it can be argued with confidence that Golden Dawn has 
successfully established a significant relationship of political representation with the personnel of the 
Hellenic Police in these key front-line units regularly policing the capital city of Greece, Athens. This 
view has been reinforced by developments in the months following the elections: both insiders, 
former officers of the Hellenic Police as well as representatives of the party itself have been quite 
vocal about the real existence and considerable extent of this relationship (Mason, 2012; 
Newsbeast.gr, 2012; Sarantakos & Psara, 2012). In the contemporary universe of far-right political 
formations across Europe, Golden Dawn is unmistakably among the most explicitly extremist 
(Kitching, Giusto, & Rizzo, 2013; Melzer & Serafin, 2013). That such a party and a large number of 
police officers serving in the largest and most heavily policed conurbation in Greece are converging 
politically is cause for grave concern, and would therefore justify further and intensive scholarly 
investigation. 
Unfortunately, despite the emergence of studies that have covered critical ground in recent years 
(Papakonstantis, 2003; Papanicolaou, 2006, 2011; Rigakos & Papanicolaou, 2003; Stergioulis, 2001; 
Vidali, 2007), a noticeable deficit in the scholarly study of the police still exists in Greece and as a result 
this key state apparatus remains rather obscure and impervious to both academic and thorough 
institutional scrutiny. As far as the political preferences of police personnel are concerned, the 
absence of extensive academic scrutiny of the police in Greece entails that even the types of insight 
regarding the preponderantly conservative worldview of the police, which other researchers have 
been able to draw on the basis of historical analyses as well as studies of police practice and behaviour 
elsewhere (e.g., Anderson, 2011; Chan, 1997; Crank, 2004; Emsley, 1991; Emsley, 1999; Manning, 
 1997; Skolnick, 1966; Reuss-Ianni, 1983), are largely missing in this country. Despite such limitations, 
it is possible to outline a number of both historical and current factors underpinning the convergence 
between the police and the far-right. 
Role and composition of the police force from a historical viewpoint 
From a historical perspective, the robust links between the police and the inter-war and cold-war era 
authoritarian political regimes in Greece have been well documented. Vidali (2007)'s definitive 
account of the development of the police in Greece has meticulously documented not only their 
institutional makeup as a highly militarised apparatus designed to embody the state's territorial and 
political authority and monopoly of legitimate force. Importantly, it has shown the coordinates of the 
police within a system of active ideological and physical suppression of the political left, particularly 
following the end of the Greek civil war in 1949. The police were thus positioned both within the 
boundaries of formal liberal democracy rules laid down by the amended Constitution of 1952 as the 
guardian of law and order, and within the grey area of the so-called 'paraconstitution' (Alivizatos, 
1986), that is, the system of exceptional rules retained active by provisions of the constitution and 
aiming to suppress the left, particularly communist party political discourse and activity. The fulfilment 
of the police's formal remit to enforce criminal law and protect public order was punctuated by a clear 
and rigid line of ideological demarcation between state personnel and the people, a radical divide 
between a body of state functionaries expected to adhere to the triplet 'Nation-Religion-Family', 
which provided the pillars for the construction of the post-war outlook of the political right, and 
between a general population that was deemed politically suspect and subversive unless able to prove 
its loyalty to both law and official ideology. Such institutional makeup allowed and sustained an 
ideological and practical continuum between army, secret services, police, the judiciary and other 
power centres within and around the Greek state that appears to remain consequential and deep-
rooted even today, almost 40 years into the post-1974 period of institutional liberalisation of the 
Greek state. 
The relationship between the political right and the police in Greece at the level of individual 
officers' belief systems has been considerably less well documented by scholarly research. From a 
historical viewpoint, this link emerges clearly in light of personnel selection systems that survived until 
the early 1990s and which tied the police to the relations of clientelism and patronage that have 
plagued modern Greece and the construction of the post-civil war Greek state (Vernardakis & Mavris, 
1991; Vidali, 2007). Papakonstantis (2003) has offered a more specific, valuable albeit limited, insight 
into the social origins, organisational experiences and ideological outlook of police personnel. His 
study has thus outlined the general conditions, which render the police a firmly conservative 
constituency, yet one that has been well aligned with the established bipartisan regime of the post-
1974 changeover period. An examination of the voting behaviour of the police would have been 
possible in elections prior to 2012 using the same methodology as ours. No such study exists, but it 
can be assumed with some confidence that the police vote would gravitate around the conservative 
New Democracy party. In our results, this lineage is only reflected in the ascendancy of the right 
overall, as the novel element of Golden Dawn skewed the 2012 results. The upshot of this is that 
Golden Dawn's electoral influence among the police, and more precisely among police front-line units, 
should be treated as a development, which is well out of the ordinary and calls for explanations that 
 take into account the particularities of the present conjuncture. 
Golden Dawn's political discourse and practice as police vote attractors 
In light of the right's overall electoral outlook in the special polling stations, an appropriate entry point 
to an exploration of the link between the police and the far-right would be a consideration of 
developments on the political scene in the 2000s. Such an examination would clearly point to a 
recomposition of forces in the right of the political spectrum in Greece. Golden Dawn would then 
appear as a consequence of processes uncoupling the populist and far-right from the conservative 
New Democracy party, which had successfully integrated and represented these constituencies in the 
post-1974 period. In the late 1990s and after the main vehicle of this development had been the LAOS 
party, whose political strategy and rhetorics legitimised to a large extent both the discourses and the 
political personnel of the far-right. With the onset of the crisis and LAOS's parliamentary support of 
the austerity measures, Golden Dawn exploited the critical representational gap that thus emerged. 
A more detailed analysis goes beyond the scope of this paper and readers would be well advised to 
refer to the emerging literature examining the rise of the Greek far right prior to 2012 (Dinas et al., 
2013; Ellinas, 2013; Georgiadou, 2013; Halikiopoulou & Vasilopoulou, 2013; Psarras, 2010, 2012). 
Yet what is particular about Golden Dawn is its mode of deployment as a political force. The key 
elements of the party's discourse, nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy, strong state, are 
accompanied by an equal emphasis on the use of open and organised violence as means to resolve 
social and political issues. Apart from a long stream of incidents of political violence (Psarras, 2012), 
which culminated in the judicial procedure initiated in October 2013, other investigations have 
revealed the role of the party and its membership in the rise of racially motivated attacks in Greece 
(Greek Ombudsman, 2013). The extremity of Golden Dawn's positions and practice have allowed a 
more spectacular presence in everyday life, which possesses a peculiar appeal to an increasingly 
disenchanted right-wing (and perhaps not only right-wing) audience. The members of Golden Dawn 
not only identify enemies clearly and threaten them, but also appear to stand for their target group 
of voters against the real or imagined threats posed by those enemies, for example, by organising food 
handouts and free medical exams only for Greeks, by intervening in disputes to 'settle the matter' or, 
most notably, by offering 'protection' to Greek residents in Athens against migrants. Such forms of 
political intervention are not available to conventional parties of the right, but Golden Dawn's 
methods have not been denounced by them either. In this sense, Golden Dawn, rather than an 
isolated and exceptional phenomenon, has arguably been the vehicle of a process of 'mainstreaming' 
extremist ideas and practices (Kallis, 2013), coming to a position enabling the party to appeal to the 
sensibilities of disaffected constituencies in crisis-ridden Greece (Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2015). 
The above characteristics of far-right activism can be linked with a series of contemporary 
developments in Greek policing, which may have been complicit in amplifying Golden Dawn's 
influence. 
Recruitment and training 
Firstly, one should begin by interrogating the fast-track recruitment of personnel aiming to populate 
the Border Guards and Special Guards units towards the end of the 1990s. The procedures followed 
 at the time prioritised individuals with a military, particularly special forces background and took 
considerable shortcuts with their training (Rigakos & Papanicolaou, 2003). In the past decade, these 
categories have been fully incorporated within regular police ranks and are regularly assigned to 
regular city patrol units, including DIAS. The background, training and career progression path of these 
individuals differed significantly from those of regular police personnel, who are recruited by means 
of a national examination and trained in police academies for a longer period of time and on the basis 
of a more varied curriculum.  
As a result, the hybridisation of Greek police personnel composition via fast-track recruitment has 
reinforced the militarising tendencies of the Hellenic Police, arguably at the expense of training and 
socialisation into professional policing standards (Vidali, 2007). Recruitment for these new categories 
of police personnel has capitalised on prior special army forces experience, it has provided fertile 
ground for Golden Dawn's message. This is because those individuals had been already socialised into 
a culture of militarism, confrontational styles, and forcible resolution of conflicts; they had also been 
exposed to the rigidly conservative and nationalistic ideological outlook, which is known to 
characterise army special forces in Greece (see Christopoulos, 2014a, 2014b). Reports concerning 
Golden Dawn and police complicity on the streets, and, more generally, instances of police prejudice, 
discrimination and excessive use of force in line with Golden Dawn's political stance and practice have 
often involved officers originating from this personnel category (Human Rights Watch, 2015; 
Zougla.gr, 2013). 
Deployment 
Secondly, and following from the above, one should not fail to notice the adoption by the political 
leadership (and the acceptance by police leaders) of a peculiar mix of reassurance and suffocation 
policing strategy for the inner city. This strategy has defined developments in Greek policing since the 
turn of the century. On one hand, the Hellenic Police's already heavily militarised presence has gained 
an ubiquitous character, including the systematic assignment of riot police squads to guard duty in 
the city centre carrying their full equipment. On the other, organisational approaches such as the 
formation of DIAS are rapidly proving to be a double miss: on the one hand, as incidents of the kind 
are not that frequent, the members of the squad are often seen lying idle, or, at worst, inventing their 
own work by performing stops and searches, particularly of individuals of colour or different ethic 
origin (Human Rights Watch, 2013); and on the other, when such incidents do happen, the personnel 
of the squad has proved to be vulnerable when confronting determined opponents. 
In short, heightened militarisation and unstructured exposure to street conditions are likely to 
further alienate an already strained personnel and entrench the stereotypes around which their 
outlook is already structured. Very recently, research into the relation between the police and various 
marginalised groups in the context of everyday work has indicated the possibility that police personnel 
may take recourse to confrontational styles and violence precisely in reaction to their unstructured 
exposure to the situation of those groups (Gasparinatou, 2015; Vidali, 2015). Such evidence would 
justify the idea that work systems and procedures of the police in Greece may amplify the possibility 
of misconduct as a practical solution to police occupational challenges. 
 Leadership and organisational culture 
Finally, the very stance of the political leadership of the Ministry of Public Order may have had an 
important legitimising effect on the police practices influenced or inspired by Golden Dawn. This idea 
stands well in line with extant knowledge (Bordua & Reiss, 1966; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993; Walker, 2005; 
Wilson, 1968) of the considerable effects of police leadership and managerial cultures on rank-and-
file conduct and misconduct. Under the coalition government led by the New Democracy party, the 
Ministry of Public Order came under conservative control, and the heavy emphasis of the political 
leadership on law and order fostered a regime of tolerance towards the frequently reported incidents 
of police abuse, racist or other forms of harassment which typically involve some practical complicity 
with Golden Dawn. The ministry's leadership has also backed firmly the massive sweep operations 
against migrants launched by the Hellenic Police, which are ongoing since August 2012 and are code-
named 'Xenios Zeus' (‘Hospitable Zeus’). In the course of these stop and detain operations, large 
numbers of individuals of foreign origin are rounded up (Karyotis, 2005), and those found to be 
'undocumented' are then detained at the immigration detention camps, which have been 
mushrooming in the past decade, particularly since the days of the 2012 coalition government. It is 
particularly in the context of these operations that serious concerns about police racist and 
xenophobic abuse have been raised (Human Rights Watch, 2013). 
Is Golden Dawn's discourse legitimising discrimination and violence? 
In light of the preceding discussion, Golden Dawn's appeal to front-line police units can be seen as the 
complex result of the interplay between historical, organisational and situational factors. If both 
organisational structure and organisational environment matter for the shaping of police culture 
(Crank, 2004; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993; Wilson, 1968), then all the above developments can be shown as 
conducive to Golden Dawn's rising influence among front-line units in particular. Let us then offer a 
synthesis, which, in our view, opens up interesting and concrete possibilities for further empirical 
exploration. 
Within the Hellenic Police, the onset of the crisis in 2010 has exacerbated tensions arising from 
both what are perceived as operational challenges and the organisational responses to those 
challenges. The pervasiveness of the crisis is not a simple correlate of the severe fiscal austerity that 
has fuelled the popular movement of opposition and protest, but also a culmination of other particular 
issues, such as the degradation of quality of life in urban areas typically attributed by mainstream 
media and many politicians to the influx of undocumented migrant and rising fear of crime. The 
Hellenic Police, a force heavily characterised by bureaucratism and militarism (Papanicolaou & 
Rigakos, 2014), has invariably spearheaded the response of the Greek state toward containing popular 
protest and upholding order in the inner city, while its membership, according to police unions, is itself 
acutely subjected to a degradation of work conditions, security and general status of the personnel 
(POASY, 2014). 
Golden Dawn, on its part, has conveniently positioned itself on the political scene as a force 
against both left-wing popular protest and the threat of out-of-control undocumented migration. It 
has undertaken open action, such as the orchestration of local protests, the persecution of migrants 
(Greek Ombudsman, 2013; Kountouris, 2010; Mason, 2012) and even the direct confrontation with 
 left-wing activists (Vythoulkas, 2013). As such actions escalated in the period leading to the 2012 
elections and subsequently, Golden Dawn has been increasingly seen by the police not only as 'part 
of the gang', but also as part of the solution. The practical alliances forged with the riot police in the 
heated environment of street fighting against protesters and activists correspond to the practical 
alliances forged in the environment of everyday neighbourhood policing, where front line patrol and 
emergency response police personnel are pressed hard to reassure a worried and agitated public. 
Golden Dawn's activism, mixing violence against the racialised, vilified and criminalised other with a 
helping hand and a smiling face towards inner city residents, either in the form of food banks, blood 
donations or personal protection resembles in practice the actions of police—and in so far as it is 
received as police action by the general public, Golden Dawn appeals to the spontaneous ideology of 
the police personnel as a practical ally and an extension of the police organisation itself (Human Rights 
Watch, 2015; Smith, 2012). 
Such practical alliances, of course, should theoretically become less tenable as more police officers 
join the ranks of Golden Dawn. In fact, the party's actions, far from being a helping hand to the police, 
pose a direct challenge to the authority of the police and of the state, in so far as they are a substitute 
for police and state. Yet Golden Dawn's theory and practice, which should be entirely foreign to any 
modern professional and democratically accountable police force, is capable of having a crucial 
desensitising and neutralising ideological effect. In so far as it views political dissent as a μίασμα to be 
cleansed by means of violent suppression of the dissenting individuals, just as the non-Greeks are 
viewed as subhumans to be humiliated, expelled and if possible, exterminated,3 it addresses 
effectively the acute contradictions emerging in the everyday police experience. That is, the 
experience of a police force sworn, on the one hand, to the protection of a regime that they 
themselves often view as corrupt and inimical to their material interests and, on the other, instructed 
to suppress the problems of wide popular dissent and of floating migrant populations living a 
miserable and pauperised existence in public spaces, problems which, essentially, are not meant to 
be solved by police means. The rhetoric and practice of Golden Dawn is shrewdly tuned to the 
spontaneous ideology of the police, which is already predicated upon conservativism (Papakonstantis, 
2003). 
Conclusion 
Using electoral data from the twin election of 2012, we have attempted to establish a baseline for the 
exploration of the extent of the political influence of the extreme right among the major, particularly 
front-line police units in Greece's capital city. Clearly, while we find compelling evidence that this 
influence is extensive, our analysis only permits tentative conclusions, and rather raises questions for 
further investigation rather than settles any. In our view, a consideration of the relation between 
extreme right and the police through the lens of the ongoing reconfiguration of the political right in 
Greece seems to us a solid basis for further analysis. Along the lines suggested in the previous section, 
we see more than a happy transient affair taking place between the extreme right and the personnel 
of the police, one which could be taken as an aberration and be dealt with by means of reformed 
                                                     
3 Reportedly, attacking and even killing an individual of an 'inferior' race is an initiation ritual for Golden Dawn 
members (Psarras, 2012). Yet many in Greece are slow or unwilling to recognise the connection of such rituals with the 
dramatic increase of racist attacks, often in plain daylight (Greek Ombudsman, 2013). 
 standards of service and a tightening of operational controls 'from above'. Consequently, our 
suggestion for further research, which is acutely needed, would be to relate the far-right's political 
discourse and practice with the specific determinants of front-line police culture and mentality in 
Greece. 
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 Table 1: National, district and sampled polling stations results by party and political orientation, 6 May and 17 June 2012 
 6 May 2012 17 June 2012 
 Greece 7 Dept Amp Spec Amp Reg  Athens B Kes Spec Kes Reg  Greece 7 Dept Amp Spec Amp Reg  Athens B Kes Spec Kes Reg 
Registered 9945859 88477 29219 15231  1419469 15724 10207  9947876 89188 30364 14801  1420926 15944 10214 
Turnout % 65.12% 65.00% 67.84% 60.72%  73.46% 69.70% 63.41%  62.49% 64.11% 66.25% 62.73%  70.81% 66.08% 60.58% 
Valid votes 6324136 56685 19398 9352  1024000 10736 6372  6155464 56731 19960 9207  988870 10446 6139 
ND 18.85% 15.92% 16.99% 18.17%  12.40% 10.54% 9.21%  29.66% 31.67% 33.13% 33.78%  26.49% 23.13% 17.93% 
SYRIZA 16.79% 18.21% 14.17% 18.41%  21.82% 21.83% 26.82%  26.89% 25.01% 19.43% 25.86%  31.75% 31.05% 39.18% 
PASOK 13.18% 9.77% 9.13% 10.82%  9.07% 9.04% 9.81%  12.28% 8.82% 8.18% 9.30%  8.63% 8.04% 8.88% 
ANEL 10.62% 8.93% 10.11% 8.40%  11.01% 9.03% 9.01%  7.51% 6.21% 6.84% 6.18%  7.45% 6.17% 6.47% 
GDawn 6.97% 9.41% 15.31% 6.36%  6.71% 12.16% 4.77%  6.92% 8.60% 14.28% 5.72%  6.44% 10.76% 4.97% 
KKE 8.48% 8.09% 6.21% 8.55%  9.64% 15.19% 17.40%  4.50% 4.49% 3.36% 4.45%  5.42% 9.10% 10.21% 
DA 6.11% 6.27% 5.91% 6.29%  6.60% 5.55% 6.14%  6.25% 7.61% 7.06% 7.58%  7.79% 6.01% 7.02% 
LAOS 2.89% 2.95% 3.42% 2.66%  2.78% 2.92% 2.31%  1.58% 1.85% 2.26% 1.64%  1.70% 1.81% 1.24% 
DemKs 2.15% 3.72% 3.47% 3.76%  3.77% 2.24% 2.76%  1.59% 2.71% 2.59% 2.67%  2.34% 1.52% 1.58% 
Drasi 1.80% 4.75% 4.18% 4.79%  3.44% 1.71% 1.52%          
DS 2.55% 2.45% 2.28% 2.63%  2.05% 1.37% 1.33%          
Greens 2.93% 3.00% 2.59% 2.99%  3.45% 2.54% 3.15%  0.88% 0.94% 0.88% 0.83%  1.05% 0.70% 0.96% 
ANTARSYA 1.19% 1.52% 1.09% 1.37%  1.49% 1.23% 1.35%  0.33% 0.43% 0.23% 0.39%  0.44% 0.28% 0.36% 
Other 5.48% 5.03% 5.14% 4.78%  5.77% 4.63% 4.41%  1.60% 1.67% 1.77% 1.60%  0.50% 1.42% 1.21% 
 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%  100.00% 100.00% 100.00%  100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%  100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
                  
Left 45.75% 46.84% 39.10% 48.44%  48.63% 55.38% 64.67%  50.26% 47.29% 39.13% 48.41%  54.04% 55.19% 66.61% 
Right 45.84% 48.13% 55.76% 46.78%  42.15% 39.99% 30.92%  47.26% 51.04% 59.10% 49.99%  44.42% 43.39% 32.19% 
XRight 9.87% 12.36% 18.73% 9.02%  9.49% 15.09% 7.08%  8.50% 10.45% 16.54% 7.36%  8.14% 12.57% 6.21% 
Note: Amp= Ampelokipoi; Kes= Kesariani. Left = SYRIZA, PASOK, KKE, DIMAR, Greens, ANTARSYA; Right=ND, ANEL, GDawn, LAOS, DemKs, Drasi (May only), DS (May only); Xright= Gdawn, 
LAOS. Source: Ministry of Interior, Hellenic Republic (www.ekloges.ypes.gr) 
 
  
 Table 2: Statistical analysis of election results, Ampelokipoi and Kesariani, 6 May 2012 
 Ampelokipoi (Elect Depts 27–29, 37–38)  Kesariani (Elect Depts 1–2) 
 Spec (N=42) Reg (N=28) 
 
test statistic 
 Spec (N=25) Reg (N=19)  test statistic 
 
M Mdn M Mdn M diff t 
Mann-
Whitne
y U 
p (2-
tailed) 
 M Mdn M Mdn M diff t 
Mann-
Whitne
y U 
p (2-
tailed) 
Register 695.69 683.50 543.96 540.50 151.73  7.5 .001  628.96 635.00 537.21 535.00 91.75  30.5 .001 
Turnout 67.83 68.94 62.71 62.66 5.12 3.50  .001  69.94 66.34 63.41 62.92 6.53  90.0 .001 
ND 17.11 16.85 18.15 17.85 -1.04  491.0 .245  10.52 11.11 9.19 9.68 1.33 2.00  .052 
SYRIZA 14.23 14.00 18.43 18.13 -4.19 -6.62  .000  21.93 21.45 26.73 26.85 -4.80 -5.06  .001 
PASOK 9.21 9.14 10.77 10.76 -1.56 -3.28  .002  9.06 8.62 9.78 9.92 -0.72  182.0 .188 
ANEL 10.12 10.30 8.37 8.51 1.75 3.83  .001  9.05 8.83 8.99 8.67 0.06 0.12  .908 
KKE 6.20 6.01 8.55 8.52 -2.35  153.0 .001  15.17 14.29 17.55 16.72 -2.37 -2.60  .013 
GDawn 14.83 14.58 6.33 6.28 8.50  61.0 .001  12.17 12.48 4.74 5.01 7.43  26.0 .001 
DIMAR 5.94 5.89 6.30 6.23 -0.36 -1.00  .322  5.49 5.69 6.16 6.04 -0.67 -1.75  .088 
Greens 2.61 2.66 3.01 2.96 -0.40  447.5 .092  2.53 2.36 3.17 3.31 -0.64 -2.77  .008 
LAOS 3.40 3.46 2.65 2.72 0.75 3.08  .003  2.92 2.81 2.30 2.56 0.63 2.20  .033 
DS 2.33 2.21 2.66 2.41 -0.32 -1.32  .190  1.38 1.23 1.33 1.42 0.04 0.20  .843 
DemKs 3.49 3.36 3.80 3.70 -0.32 -1.02  .312  2.24 2.33 2.79 2.73 -0.55  164.0 .082 
Drasi 4.27 4.21 4.85 4.73 -0.58 -1.59  .116  1.70 1.63 1.55 1.70 0.15 0.65  .517 
ANTARSY
A 
1.10 1.12 1.35 1.30 -0.25 -1.65  .104  1.22 0.99 1.34 1.24 -0.12  212.0 .546 
Other 5.14 5.15 4.78 4.88 0.37 1.10  .276  4.63 4.48 4.39 4.33 0.24  218.0 .644 
Left 39.30 40.39 48.41 48.72 -9.11 -8.77  .001  55.40 54.70 64.73 64.71 -9.33 -7.35  .001 
Right 55.56 54.53 46.81 46.74 8.75 7.99  .001  39.97 40.98 30.89 30.65 9.09 7.22  .001 
XRight 18.23 17.76 8.98 9.17 9.25  57.0 .001  15.09 15.85 7.04 7.08 8.05  27.0 .001 
Note: Spec= Special polling stations; Reg = Regular polling stations; Left = SYRIZA, PASOK, KKE, DIMAR, Greens, ANTARSYA; Right=ND, ANEL, GDawn, LAOS, DemKs, Drasi, DS; Xright= 
GDawn, LAOS. 
 
 Table 3: Statistical analysis of election results, Athens A 7th district and Kesariani 17 June 2012 
 Ampelokipoi (Elect Depts 27–29, 37–38)  Kesariani (Elect Depts 1–2) 
 Spec (N=43) Reg (N=27)  test statistic  Spec (Ν=25) Reg (Ν=19)  test statistic 
 M Mdn M Mdn M diff t 
Mann-
Whitne
y U 
p (2-
tailed) 
 M Mdn M Mdn M diff t 
Mann-
Whitne
y U 
p (2-
tailed) 
Register 706.14 699.00 548.19 546.00 157.95  30.5 .001  637.76 634.00 537.58 534.00 100.18  0.0 .001 
Turnout 66.10 68.78 62.76 62.59 3.34  402.0 .031  66.10 63.97 60.58 58.88 5.52  83.0 .001 
ND 33.43 33.14 33.82 33.63 -0.39 -.439  .662  23.07 22.84 17.93 17.81 5.14 6.303  .001 
SYRIZA 19.65 20.36 25.86 25.29 -6.21 -6.642  .001  31.08 31.21 39.17 38.60 -8.09 -8.037  .001 
PASOK 8.27 8.14 9.26 9.34 -0.99 -2.069  .042  8.06 7.92 8.82 8.86 -0.76 -1.268  .212 
ANEL 6.73 6.71 6.21 6.25 0.51  499.0 .325  6.22 6.07 6.47 6.07 -0.25 -0.503  .618 
KKE 3.41 3.09 4.45 4.49 -1.04  315.0 .001  9.12 8.35 10.29 10.07 -1.17  163.0 .078 
GDawn 13.56 11.66 5.69 5.87 7.87  61.0 .001  10.74 11.22 4.93 4.91 5.81  19.0 .001 
DIMAR 7.19 7.19 7.57 7.42 -0.39 -1.029  .307  5.99 6.07 7.00 6.71 -1.01 -2.190  .034 
Greens 0.91 0.90 0.82 0.70 0.09 .720  .474  0.69 0.69 0.96 0.89 -0.27  173.5 .129 
LAOS 2.23 2.22 1.63 1.51 0.60 3.167  .002  1.82 1.62 1.26 1.28 0.56  131.5 .012 
DemKs 2.62 2.63 2.69 2.59 -0.07  563.0 .833  1.52 1.50 1.60 1.59 -0.08 -0.463  .646 
ANTARSY
A 
0.24 0.19 0.39 0.29 -0.16  455.0 .118  0.28 0.25 0.36 0.31 -0.08  198.0 .340 
Other 1.76 1.77 1.59 1.51 0.16 1.012  .315  1.41 1.46 1.20 0.99 0.20  165.5 .088 
Left 39.67 41.28 48.36 48.37 -8.70  139.0 .001  55.22 54.74 66.60 66.45 -11.39 -9.223  .001 
Right 58.58 57.06 50.05 49.84 8.53  144.5 .001  43.38 43.90 32.20 32.52 11.18 9.228  .001 
XRight 15.79 14.68 7.32 7.04 8.48  63.0 .001  12.56 12.94 6.19 6.25 6.37  17.0 .001 
Note: Spec= Special polling stations; Reg = Regular polling stations; Left = SYRIZA, PASOK, KKE, DIMAR, Greens, ANTARSYA; Right=ND, ANEL, GDawn, LAOS, DemKs; Xright= GDawn, LAOS.                   
 
 
